, http://www.fiu.edu/oir/docs/msp.pdf. The student body of the College of Law, in turn, is remarkably international. A few years ago, a colleague took a census in his first year class of approximately sixty students; he learned that they were born in twenty-five different countries (Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Haiti, Honduras, India, Italy, Iraq, Iran, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Trinidad-Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia) and some of the countries on the list (e.g., Cuba) were the birthplace of multiple students. Email from Andrew Jay McClurg to Thomas E. Baker (Dec. 12, 2009 ) (on file with the author).
5
Florida International University Mission Statement, http://academic.fiu.edu/ provost_mission.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). globalism and has achieved considerable distinction in the social sciences and the international realm, through its programs, centers, and institutes. 6 The College of Law is contributing to that institutional prominence. 7 We understand that our students will practice law in an increasingly globalized professional reality -their "real world" will be the "entire world." 8 Our College's mission statement provides, in part:
The College of Law offers a curriculum that prepares students for ethical and effective practice of law in an increasingly global and multicultural world. The curriculum includes a full and faithful presentation of the courses traditionally offered at nearly all U.S. law schools. In addition, building on the parent university's distinction in its international programs, the curriculum incorporates important developments in the globalization of both public and private law. The academic program takes a pervasive approach to international and comparative law, incorporating these perspectives into all domestic law classes, and includes a required introductory course and a rich array of upper level electives in international, transnational and comparative law. 9 We have kept each of these curricular promises. First, we created a hybrid course that is unique in American legal education: "Introduction to Comparative and International Law," a three-hour required first-year course offered in the spring semester. other American law schools, our curriculum presents a menu of advanced, elective courses in international and comparative law.
11
Third, the corporate faculty has committed to "globalizing, internationalizing, trans-nationalizing, and comparativizing" the legal education we provide our students pervasively, i.e., in every course we teach.
12 Our Faculty Bylaw on teaching explicitly requires: "Each faculty member must be committed to excellence in fulfilling teaching responsibilities, and, consistent with the mission of the College of Law, devote a minimum of one class hour per course credit hour to coverage of relevant international and comparative law materials in their domestic law classes, except seminars."
13
In the rest of this paper, I will explain how I meet this obligation in my first-year, first semester four-hour required course on constitutional law.
14 The general advice I would offer my reader would be to . 11-14, 2009 ), http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/papers/Eliantonio&Kiiver(thenetherlands).pdf (evaluating the two competing approaches of teaching comparative constitutional law on a country-bycountry basis versus a comparison subject-by-subject basis). 20 Of course, during the semester I also make numerous interspersed references and comments to comparative constitutional law that are brief and specific, often of a current-event nature. See The process I call bricolage is perhaps the method least familiar to U.S. constitutional scholars. Describing a people she studied who annoyingly seemed to appropriate elements of its culture from anything at hand, Margaret Mead wrote, "A picture of a local native reading the index to the Golden Bough just to see if they had missed anything, would be appropriate." Claude Levi-Strauss called this sort of activity bricolage, the assembly of something new from whatever materials the constructor discovered. Contemporary references to comparative constitutional materials may be a form of bricolage. Functionalists and expressivists worry about whether appropriating selected portions of other constitutional traditions is sensible, or whether the appropriation will "work" in some sense. The bricoleur does not have these concerns about maintaining proper borders among systems. half of the twentieth century, 23 and then they read Ran Hirschl's critique of that development from the perspective of critical theory.
24 Discussion questions include: What difference has the power of judicial review made in the constitutional history of the United States and other countries? What explains a country's attitudes towards its judicial institutions, i.e., courts, judges and the exercise of judicial review? Can other institutions of government besides the judiciary define and protect individual rights? What are the relative institutional advantages and disadvantages of the traditional three branches -Legislative, Executive, and Judicial -for interpreting the Constitution? How have different countries sought to adjust for the "countermajoritarian" difficulty of the doctrine of judicial review?
Lesson II: Transnational Interpretation. Law students today are familiar with the concept of globalization and how transnational influences transcend national boundaries and influence matters of culture and economics. Certainly, the popular culture of the United States is a significant influence around the world. Indeed, the phenomenon of "Americanization" has been derisively dubbed "McWorld." Students are asked to apply these ideas to constitutional law. Can it be imported and exported from one country to another or is a particular country's fundamental law unique -exclusive and self-contained to that country? The required readings include an article by now former Puisne Justice L'Heureux-Dube of the Supreme Court of Canada, in which she criticizes the Rehnquist Court for not engaging in the international judicial dialogue on comparative constitutional law, 25 and a case in which the Justices argue over the propriety of importing constitutional law into the United States. 26 This Lesson comes after students have been exposed to the deep structure of the Constitution, i.e., separation of powers and federalism, and after they have carefully parsed judicial opinions that self-consciously apply constitutional hermeneutics. 23 In the United States, "special measures" are usually called "affirmative action" or "reverse discrimination." In the European Community, the term is "positive action." The programs are known in India as "compensatory discrimination." Students are asked to consider whether these government programs are permitted under the various international treaties and the domestic constitutional law of the relevant country. Students are expected to respond comparativistically: first from the perspective of the United States -based on their course study -and second from the different perspective of another country of their choosing based on their reading from an extensive list of country-specific articles. terned after China's "One Child Rule," which would impose a twochild limitation on families for the stated purposes of preserving the quality of life in the state, slowing increased demand for state government services, and reducing environmental degradation. As I remind my students, their study of comparative constitutional law helps them better understand U.S. constitutional law, not unlike how reading a concurring opinion or a dissenting opinion helps them better understand a majority opinion. Their engagement with the materials during class is gratifying. Preparation is evident. Participation is animated. Discussion often goes over the allotted class time and typically spills out into the hallway.
My students' engagement with the comparative constitutional law readings is part of their evaluation in the form of an essay paper, worth ten percent of their final course grade. Having been exposed to the ongoing debate among the current Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States whether comparative constitutional analysis is an appropriate and a legitimate aspect of American judicial review, 35 they are required to take a side in this debate and write an essay to justify their position within the American judicial tradition. They are expected to consider and respond to the opposing arguments, as well, in a balanced and measured essay with examples.
36 Their thoughtful essays are further evidence of how they have begun to appreciate a comparative constitutional law perspective.
Thus, by the completion of my introductory course on U.S. constitutional law, my 1L students have begun to understand intuitively 36 Discussion Questions include: Are constitutional provisions arbitrary political constructs that are idiosyncratic to a particular country and a particular era or are there background normative principles that are universal for all peoples and constant over all time? How is the constitution of a nation related to more general and fundamental cultural traditions, i.e., does the constitution shape the culture or does the culture shape the constitution? How is your view of the proper role of a constitutional court reflected in your analysis? Does your argument depend on the nature and the content of the particular clause, i.e., is comparative analysis more appropriate for some clauses than for other clauses? Does your argument apply transnationally, i.e., would you treat comparative constitutional arguments the same whether you were a member of the Supreme Court of the United States dealing with the constitutional law of another country or whether you were a member of the constitutional court of some other country dealing with the constitutional law of the how "comparative analysis emphatically is relevant to the task of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights." 37 That is enough for me. 38 I cannot improve on Professor Howard's curriculum challenge:
[C]omparative constitutional law has been a growth industry in American law schools. Comparativism in constitutional law serves many purposes. It enriches one's study of American constitutional law by adding another dimension to our critique of what the Supreme Court does. It heightens our sense of the world beyond our national boundaries, useful to lawyers whose firms and clients operate on the international scene, but also to lawyers as world citizens. Comparative studies can also nourish our search for principles of ordered liberty and for theories of a just society.
Will comparative constitutional law contribute to the growth of American constitutional law? We watch with fascination as justices of the Supreme Court debate whether comparative data are legitimate and relevant in defining such concepts of due process of law and cruel and unusual punishment . Like rock-and-roll, judicial review is here to stay, with all due respect to Justice Scalia, who declined to comment on COURTS (1999) . Bork would allow the Supreme Court to continue to decide constitutional cases but would amend the Constitution to authorize Congress to overrule an interpretation of the Constitution by a simple majority vote. Tushnet would go farther to eliminate judicial review in the courts by a constitutional amendment, leaving the task of constitutional interpretation to Congress and populist politics. These prominent heretics, and numerous other scholars and commentators who have joined in the intellectual fray, demonstrate how the dogma of judicial review still remains controversial in the United States. But consider judicial review within a comparative constitutional law perspective.
Required Readings:
( 
Discussion Questions:
• Review the questions in the casebook at page 11-14, particularly question 4 at 12-13.
• What difference has the power of judicial review made in the constitutional history of the United States and other countries? What are its costs and benefits?
• What explains a country's attitudes towards its judicial institutions, i.e., courts, judges, and the exercise of judicial review?
• Are there viable alternatives to the legalization or constitutionalization of rights? Can other institutions of government besides the judiciary define and protect individual rights? What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of the traditional three branches -Legislative, Executive, and Judicial -for interpreting the Constitution?
• How have other countries sought to adjust for the "countermajoritarian" difficulty of the doctrine of judicial review, i.e., the inherent tension between rigid constitutionalism and judicial policymaking, on the one hand, and fundamental democratic values of political participation and representation, on the other? In order to interpret the Constitution, even an originalist must find guidance in another time and place. The framers self-consciously and forthrightly borrowed greatly from the constitutional thought of other countries. They were conversant with Aristotle, Cicero, Montesquieu, and Locke, for examples. Yet, the leading proponent of originalism on the High Court today insists "comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution." Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). There is much talk today in the popular press about "globalization" and "transnational" influences, which transcend national boundaries and influence matters of culture and economics. Certainly, the popular culture of the United States is a major influence around the world. Indeed, the process of Americanization has been derisively dubbed "McWorld." But what about constitutional law? Can it be imported and exported from one country to another or is a particular country's fundamental law unique -exclusive and self-contained to that country? What are the sources of constitutional law, i.e., when we refer to the Constitution to what are we referring? Only the four corners of the text? History and tradition? What about transnational legal documents, like the United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights? How does your answer fit into our study of the treaty power?
Required Readings: 
• What, if any, are the economic assumptions underlying the Constitution of the United States? What, if any, are its underlying socio-political assumptions? Temporally, how can it be that an eighteenth century document is still operative in the twenty-first century?
• Assuming that the Constitution functions satisfactorily and effectively in the United States, would it function the same way if it were adopted by another country? Are there some provisions of the Constitution that are idiosyncratic to the United States and others that are universal?
• Who makes the better argument -Justice Thomas concurring or Justice Breyer dissenting in the denial of the writ of certiorari in Knight v. Florida -on the issue whether the jurisprudence of other countries should inform how the Supreme Court would decide the issue whether a defendant can take advantage of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain about the resulting delay of his execution?
• According to Clair L'Heureux-Dube, Puisne Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, how do courts in different countries consider each others' judgments and what has been the role of the Rehnquist Court within what she calls the "new global judicial community?"
• Following Western political philosophy, the United States distinguishes political entitlements we call civil rights and civil liberties that are protected by the Constitution proper from other entitlements to government benefits that are provided by the state. Thus, there is a right to free speech but there is only a statutory entitlement to public assistance or welfare. Are these categories separate and distinct? What does this distinction say about the Constitution and the social traditions of the United States? Furthermore, for some fundamental rights, like the right to counsel, the state has a duty to subsidize the right if a person is indigent, but for other fundamental rights, like the right of privacy that figures in a woman's autonomy to terminate her pregnancy, the state does not have a duty to subsidize the right, even if the abortion is necessary to protect the health and life of the woman. Do these distinctions make sense in the context of background normative principles in constitutional law?
Further Readings: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) is a fundamental human rights treaty that was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966 and was ratified by the United States in 1992. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, http://www2.ohchr.org/ english/law/ccpr.htm. Article 2 contains a general norm against any state discrimination based on "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status" in regard to the rights recognized in the Covenant. Id. art. 2. Article 26 specifically provides for an international right to the equal protection of the laws:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nation or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Id. art. 26.
A second important treaty, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965 and was ratified by the United States in 1994. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S.195 , http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm. In Article I "racial discrimination" is defined as any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
Id. art. 1(1).
Article I goes on to authorize and allow for "special measures:" Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individual requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment of exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved.
Id. art. 1(4).
A third important treaty, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1979 and was ratified by the United States in 1980. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979 Dec. 18, , 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm. In Article 1, "discrimination against women" is defined as distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.
Id. art. 1.
Article 2 generally condemns discrimination against women "in all its forms," Id. art. 2, however, Article 4 specifically provides:
Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in this Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discon-tinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.
Id. art. 4.
Signatory states must reconcile these international agreements with the constitutional law of their country and their domestic policies. For example, read these treaties side-by-side with the Fourteenth Amendment and the U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the subject of affirmative action for race and gender.
Discussion Question:
• In the United States, "special measures" are usually called "affirmative action" or "reverse discrimination." In the European Community, the term is "positive action." The programs are known in India as "compensatory discrimination." But no matter what one labels these governmental programs, the question of international law is whether the programs are permitted under the UN treaties and the domestic constitutional law of the relevant country. Answer this question from the two different comparative constitutional law perspectives: first from the perspective of the United States -based on our study of affirmative action -and second from the different perspective of one of the following: Canada, China, the European Community, Germany, India, or South Africa. Choose your second perspective and then read at least one applicable article from the following list to help you answer the second part of the question: ABSOLUTES (1992) . Professor Glendon argues in favor of the European approach, which she describes as more communitarian and more nuanced to take into account both sides of the issue, what we call the "Pro-life" side and the "Prochoice" side. She criticizes the fact that abortion policy in the United States was not worked out in the legislative process but rather was decreed by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions that not only rendered existing state statutes unconstitutional but also severely limited the scope of any subsequent state regulations. She believes that, if the states had been left alone to legislate, most legislatures would have followed the trend in the decade before the Supreme Court constitutionalized the subject and their statutes would resemble most European statutes which permit abortions but require medical findings and counseling. Professor Tribe disagrees to criticize the European statutes as amounting to either an empty promise for the "Prochoice" side or a false promise for the "Pro-life" side. He insists that the European approach of different countries taking different approaches to abortion should not be allowed among the fifty states because it would compromise the American norm of equality and undermine the entire enterprise of defining and protecting individual rights. Thus, the abortion issue and reproductive rights more generally are as contested an area of comparative constitutional law as they are for constitutional law within the United States. 
Discussion questions:
• Can you distinguish between matters of public policy that belong in the legislative branch and other matters of constitutional law that belong in the judicial branch? Does the Constitution provide
